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TO SANCTION OR NOT TO SANCTION: WHY ARGUING
AGAINST THE COURT'S PRECEDENT IS NOT AN AUTOMATIC
RULE 11 VIOLATION ACCORDING TO HUNTER v. EARTHGRAINS CO. BAKERY L
I.

INTRODUCTION

Monetary sanctions, stricken pleadings, reprimand, or a five-year
suspension from the practice of law-each is a potential punishment
for violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11.2 Not to
be taken lightly, a severe Rule 11 sanction can ruin an attorney's
career. Even a minor Rule 11 sanction can devastate an attorney's reputation in the profession. Generally, Rule 11 provides that attorneys
must avoid filing frivolous pleadings and have evidentiary support for
all factual contentions. 3 Violations of this "frivolous 4pleadings" rule
can lead to monetary fines or sanctions by the court.
What exactly does it take to warrant a fine or sanction, and what
factors do appellate courts look at when evaluating a lower court's
sanction on appeal? Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery provides
answers to these questions and an excellent analysis of the Rule 11
sanctioning process.' Hunter is distinctive among Rule 11 cases
* The author would like to thank Professor Thomas P. Anderson for his helpful
insights regarding the civil procedure issues discussed herein.
1. Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other
paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,. . .(1) it is not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other
legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivilous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law; (3) the allegations and other factual contentions
have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation
or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of
information or belief.
3. Id.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
5. See generally Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002).
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because the sanctioned attorney did not argue a false claim or frivolously pursue a material fact, but instead merely advocated against the
precedent of the Fourth Circuit.6
II.

HUNTER V. EARTHGRAINS

Co.

BAKERY 7

On February 24, 1997, Pamela A. Hunter, along with co-counsel
N. Clifton Cannon and Charlene E. Bell, represented a group of bakery
workers from Charlotte, North Carolina in a class action lawsuit
against their employer, Earthgrains Company Bakery.8 This class
action suit ("First Lawsuit") alleged that Earthgrains violated Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and made fraudulent misrepresentations when closing its Charlotte bakery.9 Although plaintiffs filed suit
in the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, Earthgrains promptly
removed the case to federal court in the Western District of North
Carolina. 10
After a narrowing of the issues, the crux of the plantiffs' class
action suit was that: (1) "a pattern and practice of racial discrimination existed" at the Charlotte bakery; (2) the workers at the Charlotte
bakery were "more skilled" and underpaid compared to workers at
other Earthgrains' locations; (3) the Charlotte bakery's workforce was
"predominately African-American," while Earthgrains' other bakeries
employed predominately white workers; and (4) Earthgrains represented the Charlotte bakery would remain open and subsequently
closed the Charlotte location."
Earthgrains denied these allegations and moved for summary
judgment contending that its "Charlotte employees were bound to arbitrate their Title VII claims under their collective bargaining agreement
("Earthgrains CBA")."'1 2 In response, plaintiffs asserted that the Earthgrains CBA "did not apply to the Title VII claims at issue."'1 3 By the
order entered April 22, 1998, "the district court awarded summary
judgment to Earthgrains", concluding that plaintiffs were obligated to
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 147-48.
9. Id. at 148.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 148. In its answer, Earthgrains also contended "that plaintiffs had failed
to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination; [and even if discrimination was
shown,] plaintiffs had failed to rebut Earthgrains' evidence of legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for closing its Charlotte bakery." These contentions, while

argued, are not pertinent to the Rule 11 issues.
13. Id.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol25/iss1/4
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arbitrate under the Earthgrains CBA. 14 In addition, the district court
included a "sua sponte directive that plaintiffs' lawyers show cause
why Rule 11 sanctions should not be imposed for their conduct in the
First Lawsuit."' 5 On May 6, 1998, the plaintiffs' lawyers responded to
the Order, seeking reconsideration of the summary judgment decision
and requesting a stay of the Show Cause Order until the summary
judgment matter was resolved.' 6 On July 21, 1998, reconsideration of
the summary judgment was denied. 7 Over the next two years, plaintiffs' counsel, Pamela Hunter, filed two additional lawsuits against
Earthgrains based on the same factual allegations. 18 On April 21,
1999, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment grant in favor of Earthgrains in the First Lawsuit.' 9
Although seemingly resolving the issue of liability, from May 1998
to June 2000, no action was taken on the Show Cause Order. 20 However, on June 16, 2000, Earthgrains filed a "Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions Pursuant to Show Cause Order" in district court. 2 1 The motion
asserted that even though the Fourth Circuit had affirmed Earthgrains'
summary judgment motion, plaintiffs' lawyers still filed "two subsequent lawsuits on the same facts."' 22 On October 23, 2000, the district
court ruled on the motion, finding Hunter's, Cannon's, and Bell's
behavior to be in violation of Rule 11.23 As a result, Hunter was barred
from the practice of law in the Western District of North Carolina for
five years. 24 The district court based its ruling on the facts that Hunter
argued contrary to the court's legal precedent set forth in Austin v.
Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., had exercised a lack of judg14. Id. at 148-49 The district court also sided with Earthgrains, accepting the
proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for closing the Charlotte bakery and that plaintiff
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
15. Id. at 149.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. The second lawsuit, filed February 9, 1999, alleged the tort of fraudulent
misrepresentation and was voluntarily dismissed. The third lawsuit, filed May 3,
2000, again alleged fraudulent misrepresentation under state law and was remanded

to state court.
19. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 149.
20. Id. at 149.
21. Id.

22. Id.
23. Id. at 150. The order under review was Williams v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery,
Order, No. 3:97CV179-P (W.D.N.C. Oct. 23, 2000).
24. Id. at 150. Attorneys Cannon and Bell received a reprimand instructing them
to "be conscious of and strictly abide by the provisions of Rule 11 in the future."
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ment and skill, and had been sanctioned by the same court eleven
years earlier.25
Ill.

FEDERAL RULE

11:

APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEw AND POLICY

In Hunter, the Fourth Circuit considered the various policies supporting Rule 11 and the proper appellate review of a Rule 11 sanction.2 6 Following existing precedent, the Fourth Circuit reviewed
Hunter's Rule 11 sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. 7 A
district court abuses its discretion when it bases a ruling on an erroneous view of the law or a "clearly erroneous" view of the evidence.2 8
Therefore, "an error of law by a district court is by definition an abuse
of discretion. "29
The circuit court stressed that "the primary purpose of [Rule 11]
sanctions against counsel is not to compensate the prevailing party,
but to "'deter further litigation abuse. ' ' 30 In fact, when monetary
sanctions are enforced, the money should be paid to the court as a
penalty, not to the opposing counsel who may have raised the Rule 11
issue. 3 1 At times, even a simple reprimand satisfies as a sufficient
sanction.32

The district court in Hunter failed to follow this policy of deterrence. 33 The district court's sanction was not "limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct. '3 4 Given the facts of this
case, even if Hunter's anti-precedent argument had warranted a Rule
11 sanction, the five-year bar from practice in the Western District of
North Carolina was clearly excessive. The district court's sanction
appeared punitive, going far beyond the intended Rule 11 policy of

deterred repetition.
25. Id. See also, Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th
Cir. 1996). The basic holding in Austin established that arbitration of Title VII and

discrimination claims was mandatory under a collective bargaining agreement, an
agreement to arbitrate was enforceable, and a plaintiff could not sue before attempting
to arbitrate.
26. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 144.
27. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 406 (1990).
28. Id.
29. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 150 (citing Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405; United States v.
Pearce, 191 F.3d 488, 492 (4th Cir. 1999)).
30. Id. at 151 (quoting In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 522 (4th Cir. 1990)).
31. Richard A. Givens, MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE § 3.70 (5th ed. 1998).
32. Id. In this case, a reprimand was given to Hunter's co-council in the First
Lawsuit. Hunter was the only attorney who appealed the sanction. Thus, all
discussion pertaining to the Rule 11 issues refers only to Hunter.
33. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 151.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
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The procedures surrounding the filing of a Rule 11 motion also
are aimed at a policy of deterrence, adding a safe harbor provision
before filing. 3 5 In Hunter, the circuit court focused heavily on the federally enacted twenty-one day "safe harbor" provision.3 6 Under the
safe harbor provision, the movant must serve the offending counsel
with a filing-ready motion, as notice, twenty-one days prior to filing the
motion with the court. 37 This notice period is intended to give the
accused party time to correct their alleged misconduct before the Rule
11 motion is filed and sanctions are imposed.3 8 In fact, the Fourth
Circuit so appreciates the benefits of the safe harbor rule that it cited
with approval three other circuits (6th, 9th, and 10th) that recently
mandated safe harbor compliance. 3 9 By mandating the use of the safe
harbor provision, the Fourth Circuit should help eliminate Rule 11
sanctions, as litigants can use the opportunity to amend any alleged
misconduct prior to the imposed sanctions.
Critics of the safe harbor provision may contend that the provision encourages frivolous pleadings by providing undeserving attorneys with an escape hatch. However, the safe harbor also protects
those attorneys who make good faith, but unfounded, pleadings, and
does not by itself promote uninformed and ignorant advocacy. Further, an ethical attorney should not have his or her career ruined by a
severe Rule 11 sanction simply because the attorney made an untimely
mistake.
IV.

FEDERAL RULE

11:

TIMELINESS

Hunter raises serious issues surrounding the timeliness of Earthgrains' Rule 11 motion.4" The district court's Show Cause Order was
issued in April 1998. 4 1 However, the Sanctions Order was not issued
until October 2000-a delay of two and a half years. 4 2 While sanctions
may be imposed when a case is no longer pending, the inordinate
delay here contravened the rule's purpose.4 3 The clear purpose of Rule
11 is to deter further frivolous litigation claims by the sanctioned attor35. See Richard A. Givens, MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE § 3.70 (5th ed. 1998).
36. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 151.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). See also Truesdell v. S. Cal. Permanente Med.
Group, 293 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2002).
38. Truesdell, 293 F.3d at 1146.
39. Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288 (6th Cir 1997); Barber v. Miller,
146 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1998); Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 208 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2000).
40. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 144.
41. Id. at 149
42. Id. at 151-52.
43. Id.
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ney.4 4 Rule 11 motions must be "served promptly after the inappropriate paper is filed, and, if delayed too long, [it] may be viewed as
untimely. '4 5 A two year-old warning regarding a Rule 11 infraction
does little to convey the gravity of an attorney's actions. Hunter itself
states that "although Rule 11 does not establish a deadline for the
imposition of sanctions, the Advisory Committee did not contemplate
that there would be a lengthy delay prior to their imposition. "46
For example, in Simmerman v. Corino, the Third Circuit reversed a
district court's Rule 11 sanction because the order was issued three
months after the entry of final order.4 7 Similarly, in Prosserv. Prosser,
the court followed Simmerman and invalidated a sanction entered
thirty months after the final order.4 8 The Simmerman court echoed
the policy discussion in Hunter. "[Rule 11] is ill served when sanctions are delayed. During the course of a delay, memories can fade
and, importantly, attorneys and parties may continue to misbehave
because they do not have the benefit of disciplinary guidance from the
court."4 9
In Hunter, Earthgrains waited fourteen months after the Fourth
Circuit affirmed summary judgment before moving for Rule 11 sanctions.5" From April 1999 to June 2000, Earthgrains did nothing to
pursue Rule 11 sanctions. 5 ' The court in Kunstler established an obligation for one to "notify [its] opponent and the court of [its] intention
to pursue sanctions at the earliest possible date."'5 2 Not only did
Earthgrains fail to pursue action at the earliest possible date, but its
fourteen-month delay clearly was inexcusable when compared with the
time period established in Simmerman.53 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit found Earthgrains' delay inexcusable despite the fact that Hunter
asserted no prejudice.5 4 The circuit court made clear that policy controls the rule, and Rule 1I's "exemplary function is ill served when
sanctions are delayed.

55

44. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
45. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 152 (citing Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean, 123
F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 1997).
46. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 152 (citing Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 398).
47. Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58 (3rd Cir. 1994).
48. Prosser v. Prosser, 186 F.3d 403 (3rd Cir. 1999).
49. Prosser, 186 F.3d at 406.
50. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 152.

51. Id.
52.
53.
54.
55.

In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 513 (4th Cir. 1990).
Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58 (3rd Cir. 1990).
Hunter, 281 F.3d at 152.
Hunter, 281 F.3d at 152 (citing Prosser, 186 F.3d at 405).
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FEDERAL RULE 11:

SANCTION STANDARDS

The primary reason for the suspension of Hunter was "that she
advanced a frivolous legal position in the First Lawsuit." 5 6 The district
court order found Hunter's legal assertions to be "utter nonsense" and
"paradigmatic of a frivolous legal contention. '57 The Fourth Circuit
reiterated, however, that arguing a legal position is only actionable
under Rule 11 if, under "reasonable objectiveness," a reasonable attorney in a similar position could not have believed the action to be
legally justified.5 8 The Fourth Circuit described the Rule 11 reasonableness standard in In re Sargent when stating, "a legal position violates Rule 11 if it has absolutely no chance of success under the
existing precedent. ' 5 9 Thus, an attorney's argument can be ineffectively pled and quickly meet dismissal, but not merit a Rule 11
sanction. 60
The Hunter court pointed out that Rule 11 is not intended to "stifle the exuberant spirit of skilled advocacy" or limit a creative
approach by ambitious counsel. 6 ' Even the use of ambiguous or
inconsequential facts may draw a dismissal, but not punishment.6 2 In
full, only the absence of legal or factual basis, coupled with no reasonable objectiveness, will merit a Rule 11 sanction.6 3
VI.

Ms.

HUNTER'S SANCTION IN LIGHT OF FOURTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT

The principle question raised in Hunter v. EarthgrainsCo. Bakery
was whether counsel's advocacy directly against the precedent of the
Fourth Circuit was enough to merit a five-year suspension. The legal
precedent at issue concerned the interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements and whether they required arbitration of federal discrimination claims.6 4 The Fourth Circuit precedent on collective bargaining
agreements was established through the court's holding in Austin v.
Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.6 5
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 153.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
In re Sargent, 136 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1998).
Hunter, 281 F.3d at 144.
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id.
See Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002).
Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
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In Austin, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging violations of Title VII
and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 66 Defendant answered the

suit claiming the two parties were bound under a collective bargaining
agreement requiring the arbitration of all gender and discrimination
based grievances. 6 7 The Austin court held that specific language was
not needed in collective bargaining agreements to mandate arbitration. 68 As a result of Austin, the Fourth Circuit's precedent was as
follows: (1) arbitration of Title VII and discrimination claims was
mandatory under a collective bargaining agreement; (2) an agreement
to arbitrate was enforceable; and (3) a plaintiff could not sue before
attempting arbitration.6 9
Reviewing the Hunter facts in light of the Austin holding, it seems
70
clear that Hunter argued against established legal precedent, right?
Well, not exactly. In light of recent case law and sister circuit holdings, the district court in Hunter failed in its research and analysis of
the Fourth Circuit's precedent in this area. The Fourth Circuit, however, did research Hunter's claims and analyzed the established collective bargaining agreement precedent.
At the time the Show Cause Order was issued by the district court,
the Fourth Circuit stood alone in its interpretation of the collective
bargaining arbitration issue. 7 On April 22, 1998, six circuits already
held contrary to the Fourth Circuit's holding in Austin concerning
whether a collective bargaining agreement could waive an employee's
statutory right to raise a Title VII cause of action.7 2
For example, the Second Circuit in Tran v. Tran reversed a prior
decision that required arbitration, finding that the plaintiffs were not
required to seek arbitration prior to presenting the merits of their
claims in a lawsuit.7 3 The Sixth Circuit followed a similar course in
Penny v. United Parcel Service, holding that "an employee whose only
obligation to arbitrate is contained in a collective bargaining agreement
retains the right to obtain judicial determination of his rights. ' 74 In
Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., the Eighth Circuit allowed the
66. Id. at 877.
67. Id. at 877-81.
68. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 154 (citing Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,
Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996)).
69. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
70. See id.. See also Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir.
2002).
71. Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002).

72. Id.
73. Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115 (2nd Cir. 1995).
74. Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 1997).
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plaintiff to pursue a Title VII claim in a judicial forum under an established collective bargaining agreement.7 5 The Seventh Circuit also
rejected the Fourth Circuit's Austin decision and adopted the majority
view in Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co. 7 6 The Tenth Circuit joined the
majority in Harrisonv. Eddy Potash, Inc., holding that arbitration was
not necessarily mandatory under a collective bargaining agreement
containing an arbitration clause. 7 7 The Eleventh Circuit followed suit
in Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, holding that
a "mandatory arbitration clause [in a collective bargaining agreement]
does not bar litigation of a federal statutory claim." 78 Finally, the
Ninth Circuit held contrary to the Fourth Circuit in a 1998 decision,
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co. 7 9 Duffield held in part "that

under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 employees may not be required, as a
condition of employment, to waive their right to bring future Title VII
claims in court." ° Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit stood alone in its
position that plaintiffs were required to arbitrate their Title VII grievances under a collective bargaining agreement.
VII.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHY IS THE FOURTH CIRCUIT ALL ALONE?

Further analysis than that provided in Hunter is necessary to fully
understand the split in the circuits, why the Fourth Circuit stands
alone in its interpretation, and how this all relates to the Rule 11 sanctions in Hunter. The legal precedent in controversy was whether collective bargaining agreements containing general language require
arbitration of individual's statutory claims, such as those arising under
Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).8 l
The interpretation of two United States Supreme Court cases created
the initial split, Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo. and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp."2
Alexander involved an African-American employee who filed a
grievance over the nondiscrimination clause in his collective bargaining agreement after being fired.8 3 An arbitration hearing was held, but
75. Varner v. Nat'l Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996).
76. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997).
77. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997).
78. Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526-27 (11th Cir.

1997).
79. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
80. Id. at 1190.
81. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 154.
82. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
83. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 38-9.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2002

9

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 4
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:115

Alexander's grievance was denied without any mention of the discrimination claim.8 4 Alexander subsequently filed a Title VII action based
on the facts of his discrimination grievance.85 Upon reaching the
United States Supreme Court, the Court reasoned that Alexander's
statutory right to trial under Title VII was not deterred by his earlier
submission to arbitration.8 6 The Court found that "in enacting Title
VII, Congress had granted individual employees a nonwaivable public
law right to equal employment opportunities that was separate and
distinct from the rights created through ....

collective bargaining."8 7

Because Congress granted access to the courts and because arbitration
procedures provided an inadequate arena for the enforcement of Title
VII rights, the Court found that disputes regarding such rights should
be heard by the courts.8 8
Gilmer was heard seventeen years later and involved Gilmer's
employment as a manager of financial services.8 9 As part of his
employment, Gilmer signed a provision agreeing to arbitrate any disagreement that arose under New York Stock Exchange rules. 90 The
rules provided for arbitration dealing with termination of employment
between a registered representative (Gilmer) and a member organization (Interstate/Johnson Lane). 9 Because Gilmer was 62-years old at
92
the time of his termination, he alleged a violation of the ADEA.
Upon reaching the United States Supreme Court, the Court held that
Gilmer was obligated to arbitrate his claim and rejected Gilmer's contentions that arbitration would deprive him of access to the courts
under Alexander.93 However, the Court distinguished Gilmer from
Alexander, noting that Alexander's arbitration provision was contained
in a collective bargaining agreement while Gilmer's was merely contained in an individual application for registration as a securities
dealer. 94
By understanding the facts of Alexander and Gilmer, it becomes
apparent where the Fourth Circuit strayed in its application and interpretation of the two cases. The split arose as circuits decided whether
84. Id. at 42.
85. Id. at 43.
86. Id.

87. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1981).
88. Alexander, 415 U.S. 36.
89. Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
90. Id. at 23.

91. Id.
92. Id. at 23-4.
93. Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
94. Id. at 35.
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Gilmer overruled Alexander.95 Only the Fourth Circuit, through its
Austin decision, interpreted Gilmer as controlling, and, thus, is the
only circuit that requires compliance with a collective bargaining
96
agreement's arbitration clause before filing suit in federal court. All
other circuits continue to follow Alexander and allow for judicial
review of Title VII or AEDA claims regardless of arbitration clauses
within collective bargaining agreements.9 7 In Bitner v. Burlington
Northern, a district court from the Tenth Circuit held that, "there is
nothing in Gilmer to suggest that the Court abandoned or even reconsidered its efforts to protect individual statutory rights from the giveand-take of the collective-bargaining process."9 8
Why did other circuits find so differently from the Fourth Circuit?
It appears that the majority of courts recognized the context in which
the Alexander and Gilmer arbitration clauses arose. 9 9 In Alexander,
the arbitration clause was contained in a collective bargaining agreement, while in Gilmer, the clause arose out of an individual application. 10 0 The key factor the majority of courts realized is that a
collective bargaining agreement contains the concerns of a group as a
whole. Therefore, a conflict could easily surface between union interests and individual interests. 10 ' Thus, the collective bargaining agreement "'seeks to vindicate [one's] contractual right[s]'. . . but does not
02
assert [one's] 'independent statutory rights accorded by Congress.'"
According to the majority, individuals in a collective bargaining agreement remain free to have their individual statutory rights tried by a
court. 10

3

In contrast, Gilmer signed an individual employment con-

tract, not a collective bargaining agreement. As a result, Gilmer bound
both his contractual and individual statutory rights under the single
10 4
individual employment contract.
95. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc. 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997).
96. Id. at 1453.
97. Id.
98. Bitner v. Burlington N., 857 F. Supp. 1484, 1488 (D.Wyo. 1994).
99. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1453.
100. Id.
101. Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997);
Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997).
102. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1454 (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 94).
103. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Harrison v. Eddy
Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g
Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997).
104. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v.
Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997).
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Evidently, the Fourth Circuit did not view the contextual differences between Gilmer and Alexander as warranting a distinction
between the two cases. As a result, the Fourth Circuit fully adopted
the Gilmer decision and enforced arbitration clauses for all agreements, both collective and individual. 10 5 Meanwhile, other circuits
recognized that the context of an arbitration clause is determinative of
whether individual statutory rights must be arbitrated or tried by the
courts.
VIII.

ANALYsis OF HUNTER'S SANCTION

Hunter was sanctioned by the district court for arguing against
the Fourth Circuit's precedent regarding arbitration clauses within collective bargaining agreements. 10 6 At oral argument, Hunter relied on
the Supreme Court's holding in Alexander.'1 7 However, Hunter's argument was weakened significantly because she failed to argue that six
other circuits already recognized Alexander as controlling.10 8 What
Hunter argued was that the general language of the arbitration clause
was not sufficiently specific to require arbitration. 10 9
Unconvinced by Hunter's arguments, the district court agreed
with Earthgrains that the collective bargaining agreement's language
"not to illegally discriminate" compelled arbitration of the Title VII
claim under Austin. 110 Thus, the district court based its suspension of
Hunter largely on the legal contention held in Austin."' The Fourth
Circuit, however, through investigation of the legal precedents at hand,
recognized a "good faith basis for Ms. Hunter to assert the position
she propounded." ' 1 2 In light of the sister circuits' contrary holdings,
the Fourth Circuit recognized that Hunter's legal claims had a possibility of success under existing case law.
Hunter's stance was supported further by a subsequent United
States Supreme Court decision." 3 On November 16, 1998, the
Supreme Court decided in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corporation that for a collective bargaining agreement to waive an individual's statutory claims, the agreement must "contain a clear and
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Hunter v. Earthgrains Co., 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 155.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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unmistakable waiver of the covered employees' rights to a judicial
forum for federal claims of employment discrimination."1' 14 The
Supreme Court further held that "the right to a federal judicial forum
is of sufficient importance to be protected against less-than- explicit
union waiver in a [collective bargaining agreement.]" ' 1 5 However, the
biggest development supporting Hunter's argument was the Court's
holding that the Wright decision explicitly distinguished Gilmer.116 In
Wright, the court noted that the Gilmer holding reflected an individual's waiver of individual rights, rather than a union's waiver of the
rights of represented employees.' 1 7 Interestingly, this was the exact
distinction recognized by the majority of circuit courts prior to Wright.
As a result of Wright, the district court in Hunter was not only following a legal position held uniquely by the Fourth Circuit, it was advocating a legal precedent in direct conflict with the United States Supreme
Court." 8
Through the combination of these factors, Hunter was clearly
"entitled ...to maintain that Austin was incorrectly decided." 119 Also,
a district court abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling on "an erroneous view of the law."' 12 0 The district court abused its erroneously
applied the law that led to the sanctioning of Hunter.' 2 ' The Fourth
Circuit stated that despite Hunter's weak advocacy, which ignored the
circuit court split and the Wright decision, Hunter's lack of thoroughness did not render her legal position frivolous. 1 22 The fact that
Hunter's advocacy was unconvincing does not dispel the fact that her
case was well-grounded and, thus, undeserving of court sanction
under Rule 11.123
114. Id. at 155 (quoting Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82

(1998)).
115. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 155-56. Of interest is that amidst the litigation of Rule 11
sanctions and precedent arguments in Hunter, the Fourth Circuit in Carson v. Giant
Food Inc., 175 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1999), actually followed suit with Wright holding
that general language is not enough under a collective bargaining agreement to waive
access to the courts when asserting individual statutory discrimination claims.
Although Ms. Hunter's First Lawsuit brought in 1997 is not cited in Carson, perhaps it
helped the Fourth Circuit realize a need for change in its precedent.
119. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 156.
120. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405 (1990).
121. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 156-57.
122. Id. at 157.
123. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 144.
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The Fourth Circuit concluded by dispelling Earthgrains' contention that Hunter's sanction should stand because she filed the two
1 24
additional lawsuits relating to the case after summary judgment.
The Fourth Circuit followed the policy behind Rule 11 when it stated
that 'Rule 11 sanctions are properly applied only to cases before the
court, not to cases in other courts. '"'125 Thus, the Fourth Circuit had
no say in whether Hunter's other lawsuits merited any Rule 11 attention. The court also discredited the district court's assertion that
Hunter exercised a lack of judgment and skill. 12 6 Except for the collective bargaining dispute, the court found no other area where Hunter
could be charged with lack of judgment and skill, and since Hunter
was found to be correct in her assertion of the arbitration issue, there
was no deficiency. 127 Finally, the Fourth Circuit addressed the district
court's finding that a previous 1989 sanction involving Hunter rendered support for its sanction decision. 1 2 8 The court held that since
the first lawsuit warranted no cause for sanctions, the prior sanction
was irrelevant to the present case. 1 29 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit
vacated Hunter's suspension from practice in the Western District of
North Carolina. 13 °
IX.

NORTH CAROLINA VS. FEDERAL RULES: THE EFFECT OF HUNTER'S
REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT

Early in the case, Earthgrains removed the case from the Superior
Court of Mecklenburg County to federal court in the Western District
of North Carolina.13 ' While the removal was most likely a routine
request to obtain a neutral forum, the effect of removal resulted in different interpretations of the Rule 11 issues in Hunter. The removal
changed the interpretation of Rule 11 because the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 are different in several aspects.1 32
Perhaps the greatest Rule 11 difference, and one that impacted
Hunter, is the standard by which an attorney's argument is reviewed.
124. Id.
125. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 157 n.19 (quoting Woodard v. STP Corp., 170 F.3d 1043,
1045 (11th Cir. 1999)).
126. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 157.
127. Id.
128. Id. In Lyles v. K Mart Corp., Hunter was sanctioned for failure to conduct an
adequate prefiling inquiry under Rule 11. 703 F. Supp. 435 (W.D.N.C. 1989).
129. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 157.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 147.
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; N.C. R. Civ. P. 11.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol25/iss1/4

14

20021

Pate: To Sanction or Not to Sanction: Why Arguing Against the Court's P
To SANCTION OR NOT TO SANCTION

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court views counsel's
argument under a "non-frivolous" standard. 133 "Non-frivolous," as
interpreted by courts, is an objective standard that asks what a reasonable attorney in like circumstances would have believed to be legally
justified. 134 The district court viewed Hunter's argument based on
what it believed a reasonable attorney would have done in light of the
bakery workers' position against Earthgrains.
However, under the North Carolina Rules, counsel's argument is
viewed with a subjective standard of good faith compliance. 135 The
language of the North Carolina rule states that an attorney must
believe that "to the best of his knowledge, information and belief...
[that his argument] . . .is well grounded in fact and is warranted by

existing law."' 136 Essentially, North Carolina abides by the "emptyhead pure-heart" analysis for its Rule 11 sanctions. 137 This subjective
standard means that so long as an attorney honestly believes that his
or her argument is legitimate, Rule 11 sanctions will not follow. 1 38

Thus, North Carolina reviews the specific attorney's beliefs, while the
federal assessment views the issue from a reasonable attorney's perspective. Had her case remained in state court, Hunter likely would
have satisfied the North Carolina subjective standard.
When viewed in comparison to the Federal objective standard, the
ineffectiveness of the North Carolina subjective standard is exposed.
The North Carolina rule appears to allow virtually any pleading to pass
without Rule 11 punishment. Such a lenient subjective standard works
against the policy of Rule 11.
North Carolina is less able to deter frivolous pleading because its
subjective standard establishes such a low bar, which allows attorneys
to escape sanctions. Moreover, how does a court determine that an
attorney actually has an "empty-head, pure-heart pleading?" North
Carolina should consider examining the policy behind Rule 11 to
determine whether an objective standard would better serve the rule's
purpose.
Another Rule 11 difference that surfaced in Hunter was the appellate court standard of review. Under the federal system, all Rule 11
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes.
134. Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002); FED. R. CIv. P.
11 advisory committee's notes.
135. N.C. R. Civ. P. 11; Turner v. Duke University, 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706

(1989).
136. N.C. R.Civ. P. 11(a).
137. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 11; FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes.
138. N.C. R.Crv. P. 11.
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sanctions are reviewed on appeal using an abuse of discretion standard
of review. 139 In contrast, North Carolina Rule 11 sanctions are
reviewed using a de novo standard. 140 Because of this, the Fourth Circuit is much less likely to overturn a trial court's holding than is the
North Carolina Court of Appeals. However, Hunter provided a very
unique case, since "an error of law is by definition an abuse of discretion."141 Hunter provides a rare example of where the abuse of discretion standard can produce a reversal of the district court.
Yet another difference between Federal and North Carolina Rule
11 is that North Carolina does not provide for a twenty-one day safe
harbor period. Ordinarily, Federal Rule 11 requires compliance with
the twenty-one day safe harbor provision, however, Hunter is an example where the federal rules do not require compliance with the safe
harbor provision. In federal cases, any Rule 11 accusation made by the
court sua sponte in the form of a Show Cause Order does not require
satisfaction of the twenty-one day safe harbor rule. 142 The reasoning is
simple. The purpose of the safe harbor provision is to allow the attorney to remedy any alleged misconduct before the opposing side files a
motion with the court. 14 3 When a Rule 11 action is initiated sua
sponte, however, the issue is already before the court and a safe harbor
time period is unnecessary. 1 4 4 As stated in Sutton v. American Federation, "the 21 day safe harbor provision does not apply to those situations where the court sua sponte issues a Rule to Show Cause.' 1 45 The
Hunter court agreed, declaring that "a sua sponte show cause order
deprives a lawyer against whom it is directed of the mandatory twenty'
one day 'safe harbor' provision." 146
Therefore, despite the fact that
North Carolina has no safe harbor and the Federal Rules enact the
protective provision, Earthgrains' removal to federal court made no dif139. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
140. Turner v. Duke University, 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989).
141. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 150.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes. In Hunter, the sua sponte order
refers to the court itself recognizing the need for Rule 11 discussion and sanctions, not
the opposing party. While in Hunter the opposing counsel did themselves raise a Rule
11 motion, their motion was based off the district court's original sua sponte Show
Cause Order. Earthgrains' motion was entitled, "Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
Pursuant to Show Cause Order."
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; Truesdell v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 293 F.3d 1146
(9th Cir. 2002).
144. Sutton v. Am. Fed'n, 1997 WL 34663 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
145. Id.
146. Hunter, 281 F.3d at 151.
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ference in Hunter, as the sua4 7sponte order caused the existence of a
1
safe harbor to be irrelevant.
A final distinction between Federal and North Carolina Rule 11 is
the "may" versus "shall" distinction. 14 Once a federal court determines that an attorney has violated Rule 11, the court "may ... impose
an appropriate sanction.' 1 49 Once a North Carolina state court establishes a Rule 11 violation, however, the rule mandates that "the
court ...

shall impose .

.

. an appropriate sanction.'

150

Accordingly,

even after a clear Rule 11 violation, federal courts still have discretion
whether to administer sanctions;' once a North Carolina court establishes a Rule 11 violation, it is required to administer the appropriate
Hunter did not demonstrate the "may" versus "shall" dissanction.
despite
tinction, as the district court administered Hunter's 5 sanction
3
the option not to under the federal "may" standard.1
While the North Carolina and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 11 differ, the distinctions expose a well-thought-out structure for
both jurisdictions. Initially, the North Carolina "shall" sanction language appears harsh given the damage a Rule 11 sanction can do to an
attorney's career.15 4 To mitigate this harshness, North Carolina
reviews such sanctions with a de novo standard of review.15 5 At the
appellate level, the sanctioned attorney is afforded a full review of the
facts surrounding the sanction and has the opportunity to have the
sanction overturned.' 56 On the other hand, while the federal "may"
language only serves to sanctions some, the appellate courts effectively
rubber-stamp sanctions using an abuse of discretion standard of
review.1 57 Thus, Federal Rule 11 filters sanctions at the trial court
level with its "may" language, while North Carolina Rule 11 filters8
sanctions at the appellate level with a de novo standard of review.'1
Although pieces of the North Carolina or Federal Rule 11 may appear
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Hunter v. Earthgrains Company Bakery, 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002).
FED. R. Civ. P. 11; N.C. R. Civ. P. 11.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(c).
N.C. R. Civ. P. 11(a).
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
N.C. R. Civ. P. 11.
See Hunter v. Earthgrains Company Bakery, 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002); FED.

R. Civ. P. 11.
154. N.C. R. Civ. P. 11.
155. Turner v. Duke University, 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989).
156. N.C. R. Civ. P. 11; Turner v. Duke University, 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706

(1989).
157. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990);
158.

FED.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 11.

R. Civ. P. 11; N.C. R. Civ. P. 11.
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better than the other, when viewed as a whole, the two rules serve
essentially the same purpose.
X.

PRECEDENT:

Is

ARGUING AGAINST

A

COURT'S ESTABLISHED

OPINION WRONG?

Throughout Hunter, the court analyzed whether a court's established precedent is open to discussion. 159 Although the district court
treated Hunter's precedent challenge as taboo, the Fourth Circuit
investigated areas both within and outside of the court's precedent,
opening the issue for discussion.16 ° In conjunction with its decision to
vacate Hunter's sanction, the Fourth Circuit approved the analysis of
its sister circuits, stating "Ms. Hunter under Rule 11(b)(2) was plainly
entitled to maintain [her position].''
What the Fourth Circuit did
was open its analysis to include positions both inside and outside of
the Fourth Circuit's precedent.
In fact, in a previous decision, the Fourth Circuit found directly in
favor of valid precedent challenges.' 62 In Blue v. United States Department of the Army, the Fourth Circuit found that "the fact that a civil
rights litigant pressed a legal position which courts had previously
rejected was not thought to constitute a species of sanctionable conduct."'163 The language in Blue speaks directly to the Hunter's situation, as both cases dealt primarily with a Title VII violation.' 64 Blue
went on to support arguments against precedent by citing the famous
16 5
United States Supreme Court case, Brown v. Board of Education.

The Blue court reasoned that had precedent been absolute, counsel
who brought the case in Brown v. Board of Education might have been
thought to engage in sanctionable conduct by arguing a claim in direct
conflict with the established precedent in Plessy v. Ferguson.'66 Imagine how the landscape of American society would have suffered had
the Supreme Court in Brown stuck stubbornly to the Court's precedent
in Plessy.

Another important factor affecting precedent is the dynamic
nature of cultures and citizens. Precedent established by one genera159. See generally Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 157.
162. Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990).
163. Id. at 534.
164. See Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990);
Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002).
165. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
166. See id.; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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tion often speaks directly against the best wishes of a later generation.
For example, neither the Brown decision, nor the entire civil rights
movement, would likely have occurred but for the Untied States
Supreme Courts' willingness to assess and reverse its established
precedents. "Merely because the authorities at a particular point in
time believed an argument [to be] frivolous is no reason it should not
1 67
be asserted."'
XI.

CONCLUSION: DOES HUNTER MAKE GOOD CASE LAW FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT?

Upon review, Hunter establishes excellent case law for a number
of reasons. Principally, Hunter illustrates that a court's precedent is
not supreme and can be open to debate. However, Hunter still alerts
counsel to the fact that a precedent argument must be legitimate and,
under the Federal Rules, "non-frivolous.' 16 The effect of Hunter
leaves open the opportunity for zealous advocacy, yet still enforces the
intended policy of Rule 11.
Secondly, Hunter establishes a thorough record of the Fourth Circuit's struggle with collective bargaining agreements and individual
statutory rights. Taken in conjunction with the recent Carson v. Giant
Food, Inc. holding, Hunter will help join the Fourth Circuit with the
majority, thus eliminating all future uncertainty regarding individual
69
rights under a collective bargaining agreement. 1
Third, the decision in Hunter illustrates several procedural issues
regarding Rule 11. Perhaps most noteworthy are the explanation of
sua sponte show cause orders and the analysis of Rule 11 sanctions
using the abuse of discretion standard of review. Furthermore,
because the case was removed, Hunter provides a contrast between the
North Carolina and Federal Rule 11 standards.
In Hunter, the Fourth Circuit analyzed and reversed a Rule 11
sanction, helped clarify Fourth Circuit precedent, and opened the door
for valid precedent challenges in the future. Ultimately, Hunter v.

167. Richard A. Givens,

MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 3.70 (5th ed. 1998).

168. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes. In Smith v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United, the Seventh Circuit actually affirmed an attorney's Rule 11 sanction
because his argument against precedent was overtly frivolous in relation to Seventh
Circuit precedent. 959 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1992).
169. Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1999); Hunter v. Earthgrains
Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002).
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EarthgrainsCo. Bakery illustrates the dynamic nature of case law and
the duty of the courts to understand when the time is ripe to alter
precedent.
William H. Pate
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